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NOTE 
“CAMELS AGREE WITH YOUR THROAT” AND OTHER LIES: 
WHY GRAPHIC WARNINGS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT 
CONSUMER DECEPTION 
Ellen English* 
Abstract 
 The government’s latest attempt to protect consumers from the perils 
of tobacco use is in jeopardy. In 2009, Congress enacted the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which requires cigarette 
advertisements and packages to bear nine new textual health warnings 
and gives the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products. In 2011, in 
compliance with the Act, the FDA issued a regulation, known as the 
graphic warning requirement, which mandates that a color graphic 
image accompany each of the nine textual warning statements. The 
graphic warning requirement now faces challenges from the tobacco 
industry, and the ambiguities current standards present divide courts as 
to the constitutionality of the warnings.  
 Part I introduces the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act and the graphic warning requirement. Part II provides an 
overview of the protections the First Amendment affords commercial 
speech, specifically tobacco advertisements and labels. Part III sets out 
the framework for the levels of scrutiny the Supreme Court has applied 
to compelled and commercial speech. Part IV explains the current 
circuit split and analyzes the courts’ treatment of the issue. The 
deceptive nature of tobacco advertisements, the impact of tobacco 
advertising, and the effectiveness of the new warnings are described in 
Part V. In conclusion, this Note emphasizes the deceptive nature of past 
and present tobacco advertisements and urges the Court to further 
develop compelled commercial speech doctrine to better enable 
mandated disclosures of health hazards to pass constitutional muster. 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. expected, May 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S., 2011, 
Troy University. To Mom, Dad, and Will—thank you for your constant encouragement, 
patience, and willingness to listen. A special thank you to the editors of the Florida Law Review 
for their hard work and dedication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“More Doctors smoke CAMELS than any other cigarette” bragged a 
1951 advertisement printed in the Boston Globe.1 Eva Cooper of 
Massachusetts blamed this advertisement, among others, for her 
husband’s untimely death.2 Cooper, the first plaintiff in a long history of 
litigation surrounding tobacco’s harmful health effects,3 pointed to this 
advertisement in response to an interrogatory that followed the 
complaint she filed against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and 
blamed the manufacturer of Camel cigarettes for killing her husband, 
Joseph.4 The complaint alleged that Joseph’s reliance on misleading 
cigarette advertisements caused his lung cancer and resulting death.5 
Specifically, Cooper claimed that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 
“daily and in a negligent and reckless manner . . . inserted certain 
advertisements in newspapers, radio and television and other media 
which [] were false and misleading and [her husband] relied upon [the] 
advertisements . . . [and] continued to smoke ‘Camel’ cigarettes”6 
Cooper’s claim was eventually dismissed on summary judgment,7 and 
she was only the first of decades of tobacco liability plaintiffs to leave 
the courtroom empty-handed.8 In fact, a jury did not hand over a verdict 
in favor of a tobacco liability plaintiff until 1988.9 Many of the plaintiffs 
who followed Cooper’s lead also based their claims against the tobacco 
giants on the industry’s misleading statements regarding the dangers of 
tobacco consumption.10  
While the courts sided with the tobacco companies,11 the legislative 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464, 466 (1st Cir. 1958).  
 2. Id.; Complaint at 1–2, Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. 
Mass. 1957) (No. 54-500), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/exn47a00. 
 3. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22, 23 (D. Mass. 1957); The US 
Tobacco Wars, BBC NEWS (Sept. 28, 1999, 13:59 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/457180.stm. 
 4. Cooper, 256 F.2d at 466. 
 5. Cooper, 158 F. Supp. at 23. 
 6. Complaint, supra note 2, at 3.  
 7. Cooper, 158 F. Supp. at 25. 
 8. See Douglas N. Jacobson, After Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.: How Wide Will the 
Floodgates of Cigarette Litigation Open?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1030, 1042 (1989). 
 9. See id. at 1023. 
 10. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 377 F.3d 917, 922–23 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(alleging that a tobacco company’s statement that tobacco products are not harmful to health 
was a misrepresentation); Tompkin v. Am. Brands, 219 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 11. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1021–22; Frontline: Inside the Tobacco Deal 
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branch took notice of the need for regulation in the tobacco industry.12 
The government first attempted to warn citizens of the health risks of 
smoking by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act of 1965, which mandated that cigarette packages display a warning 
that “Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”13 The Act 
was a response to a 1964 Surgeon General’s report that detailed the 
health consequences of smoking.14 Following the passage of the Act, 
Congress continued to pass legislation that regulated tobacco labeling 
and advertising,15 several pieces of which updated and strengthened the 
content of the required warnings.16 In 1970, Congress went a step 
further and prohibited cigar and cigarette advertisements “on any 
medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Communications Commission.”17   
The government’s latest effort to regulate the tobacco industry is 
codified in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.18 
This Note will examine a key provision of the Act, the graphic warning 
requirement, and the constitutional attacks to the warning requirement. 
Part I of this Note introduces the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act, specifically the graphic warning requirement, and 
the FDA’s findings in support of this requirement. Part II provides an 
overview of the First Amendment protections afforded to commercial 
speech, specifically tobacco advertisements and labels. Part III sets out 
the framework for the levels of scrutiny the Supreme Court has applied 
to compelled and commercial speech. The current circuit split on the 
constitutionality of the graphic warning requirement is explained in Part 
IV. Specifically, Part IV will explore the reasoning each court used and 
the factors that proved outcome determinative. Part IV also discusses 
the shortcomings of compelled commercial speech doctrine, as it 
currently stands, that led to the circuit split. Part V discusses the 
                                                                                                                     
(PBS television broadcast May 12, 1998), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/etc/synopsis.html (discussing the 
chronology of tobacco litigation). 
 12. See, e.g., Smoking & Tobacco Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/by_topic/policy/legislation/index.htm (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2013).  
 13. Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1028 & n.45. 
 14. Id. at 1027–28. 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 1028; Smoking & Tobacco Use, supra note 12. 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012); Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1028 n.46 (describing an 
amendment to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 that required the 
warning label to state “Warning: the Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking 
Is Dangerous to Your Health” and the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, which 
mandated four additional warnings). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1335; Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1028 n.46.  
 18. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
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deceptive nature of both past and current tobacco advertisements, the 
impact of tobacco advertisements on adolescents, and the potential 
effectiveness of graphic warnings. Finally, the conclusion emphasizes 
the need for further development of standards for evaluating the 
constitutionality of compelled commercial speech and argues that, based 
on the tobacco industry’s history of deceptive advertising and its current 
practices, courts should uphold the graphic warning requirement as it is 
vital to the prevention of consumer deception.  
I.  GRAPHIC WARNINGS: AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT DECEPTION 
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, the latest 
piece of tobacco control legislation, directs the Food and Drug 
Administration to issue a regulation that requires companies to place 
graphic health warnings on tobacco products. The Food and Drug 
Administration’s findings in support of the rule demonstrate the critical 
need for more effective warnings. 
A.  The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
On June 22, 2009, Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act19 (the Act), which amended the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act to give the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) authority to regulate tobacco products20 and to require all 
cigarette advertisements and packages to bear nine new textual health 
warnings.21 The Act also ordered the Department of Health and Human 
Services to “issue regulations that require color graphics to depict the 
negative health consequences of smoking to accompany the [textual 
warnings].”22 In 2010, the FDA issued the proposed rule (the graphic 
warning requirement)23 and issued the final rule that implemented the 
graphic warning requirement on June 22, 2011.24  
B.  Graphic Warning Requirement 
The graphic warning requirement was scheduled to become effective 
on September 22, 2012, but following a federal court ruling, the FDA is 
going “back to the drawing board” to create a new set of labels.25 As 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Id. 
 20. 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (2012); Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 
101.  
 21. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 201(a). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524 
(proposed Nov. 12, 2010). 
 24. 21 C.F.R. § 1141.10 (West, WestlawNext through December 19, 2013) (overruled by 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012)).  
 25. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
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stated above, the graphic warning requirement mandates that each of the 
nine textual warning statements is accompanied by a color graphic 
image.26 The graphic warnings must be noticeable on both packages and 
advertisements and cover fifty percent of both the front and back of 
cigarette packages and twenty percent of advertisements.27 Electronic 
images of the original graphic warnings are contained in a document 
labeled “Cigarette Required Warnings” which is incorporated into the 
Code of Federal Regulations.28 The warning statement “Cigarettes are 
Addictive” is supplemented with a picture of a man exhaling through a 
tracheotomy hole; “Cigarettes Cause Fatal Lung Disease” is paired with 
a graphic of black, diseased lungs; and a photo of oral sores and 
decayed teeth accompanies the warning that “Cigarettes Cause 
Cancer.”29 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
36,628; Michael Felberbaum, AP Newsbreak: US to Revise Cigarette Warning Labels, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:54 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-us-
revise-cigarette-warning-labels. The Department of Justice chose not to seek Supreme Court 
review of the D.C. Circuit’s decision that held the graphic warnings unconstitutional. In a letter 
to John Boehner that notified him of the decision not to file a petition for certiorari, Attorney 
General Eric Holder noted: 
 
The court of appeals did not hold the provision of the Act directing FDA to 
promulgate graphic-warning regulations facially invalid. Rather, the court 
held that the particular graphic warnings adopted in FDA’s regulations 
violated the First Amendment, based on the record before FDA in the 
rulemaking proceedings, and it remanded the matter to the agency. FDA 
therefore remains free to conduct new rulemaking proceedings under the 
Act, and it can address issues identified by the court of appeals and other 
relevant issues in such proceedings. The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) has informed this Department that FDA will undertake 
research to support a new rulemaking consistent with the Tobacco Control 
Act. . . . If a court of appeals were to set aside new regulations issued by 
FDA at a later date, there will be an opportunity to seek full Supreme Court 
review at that time.  
 
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, to John Boehner, Speaker, 
U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 15, 2013), available at 
http://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/default/files/u9/Ltr%20to%20Speaker%20re%20Reynold
s%20v%20FDA.PDF. 
 26. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
36,674. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Cigarette Package and Advertising Warnings, 21 C.F.R. § 1141.10–12 (2012).  
 29. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
36,649–56; Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/ucm259214.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).  
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 30 31 32 
It comes as no surprise that tobacco companies are challenging the 
graphic warning requirement. Big tobacco argues that the requirement 
unconstitutionally infringes on their First Amendment rights.33 Two 
cases already reached the appellate level and a circuit split now exists 
between the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit.34  
C.  FDA Findings 
In support of the rule, the FDA produced findings on the occurrence 
of smoking in the United States, the health consequences of smoking, 
and the deficiencies in consumer knowledge of the risks.35 In terms of 
prevalence, the FDA voiced particular concern over the use of cigarettes 
among America’s youth.36 According to the 2008 National Survey on 
Drug Use and Health, approximately 6,600 people begin smoking each 
day, 4,000 of whom are under the age of eighteen.37 Findings also 
indicate that economically disadvantaged adults and adults with low 
levels of education have high smoking rates.38  
Statistics on the health consequences of smoking are astounding. 
Cigarette smoking is to blame for 443,000 human deaths per year in the 
United States alone.39 The FDA referenced the Surgeon General’s 2004 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 29.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 34. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1222; Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 
F.3d at 569. The tobacco industry appealed the Sixth Circuit’s ruling but the United States 
Supreme Court denied the tobacco industry’s petition for certiorari on April 22, 2013. Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3249 
(U.S. Apr. 22, 2013) (No. 12-521). 
 35. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,629 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 36,630. 
 39. Id. 
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report on “The Health Consequences of Smoking,” which indicated that 
“cigarettes have been shown to cause an ever-expanding number of 
diseases and conditions, including lung cancer, laryngeal cancer, oral 
cavity and pharyngeal cancers, esophageal cancer, bladder cancer, 
pancreatic cancer, kidney cancer, stomach cancer, cervical cancer, acute 
myeloid leukemia, all the major clinical cardiovascular diseases, COPD, 
and a range of acute respiratory illnesses.”40 The Surgeon General’s 
finding that “[c]hildren who smoke experience impaired lung growth 
and an early onset of lung function decline” is in line with concern over 
smoking initiation in young adults.41 
D.  Early Judicial Responses to Tobacco Legislation 
The graphic warning requirement is not the first piece of tobacco 
control legislation to face a challenge, but is likely to be the most 
controversial. Interestingly, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act of 1965 did not sustain significant direct constitutional 
attacks.42 More surprising is the fact that the 1969 Act, which was 
challenged on First Amendment grounds, was attacked by a broadcast 
company, rather than a tobacco manufacturer.43 In Capital Broadcasting 
Company v. Mitchell, a broadcasting company alleged that the Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969’s prohibition on cigarette 
advertisements violated the First Amendment.44 The court found the ban 
constitutional.45 Capital Broadcasting Company is not particularly 
helpful to the analysis of the graphic warning requirement issue 
because, as the court stated, the broadcasters themselves “lost no right 
to speak—they have only lost an ability to collect revenue from others 
for broadcasting their commercial messages.”46 However, the court’s 
observation that “advertising is less vigorously protected than other 
forms of speech” is still relevant.47  
 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 36,631. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Much of the litigation provoked by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act of 1965 concerned preemption. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 
1968); Lora B. Greene, Constitutional Law—Preemption of State Common Law Actions Against 
Cigarette Manufacturers by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act: Have Smokers 
Taken Their Last Puff to Hold Tobacco Companies Liable under a State Tort Claim?—Palmer 
v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 467, 468 (1988) (discussing the Act’s preemption of 
state laws). 
 43. Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 583 (D.D.C. 1971). 
 44. Id. at 584.  
 45. Id. at 583. 
 46. Id. at 584. 
 47. Id. 
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II.  TOBACCO ADVERTISEMENTS AND LABELS ARE ENTITLED TO FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
 
 Tobacco advertisements and labels can be classified as both 
commercial and compelled speech. The First Amendment protects 
commercial speech, albeit to a lesser extent than other forms of speech, 
and in some instances protects individuals from being compelled to 
speak. 
A.  Tobacco Advertisements and Labels are Forms of  
Commercial Speech 
The first step in analyzing the First Amendment protections afforded 
tobacco advertising and labeling is to determine the speech 
classifications of tobacco advertisements and labels. The Supreme Court 
long ago defined commercial speech as speech that does “no more than 
propose a commercial transaction”48 The Court continually applies this 
definition in commercial speech cases.49 In a leading commercial 
speech case, the Court clarified this definition of commercial speech to 
encompass any “expression related solely to the economic interests of 
the speaker and its audience.”50 Furthermore, the Court made it clear 
that commercial speech includes advertisements.51 It also established 
that labels on food and drug packages are forms of commercial 
speech.52 Thus, tobacco advertisements and tobacco product labels are 
forms of commercial speech.  
B.  Commercial Speech is Protected Speech, but Not  
Without Exceptions 
The Supreme Court originally refused to find First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech.53 However, the Court gradually shied 
away from that position54 and affirmatively renounced that view in 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973).  
 49. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
 50. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980).  
 51. See id. at 563 (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on 
the informational function of advertising.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (“[T]he 
advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one.”); Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385 (noting 
that advertisements are “classic examples of commercial speech”). 
 52. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995).  
 53. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (finding that “the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”). 
 54. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759–60. 
9
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.55 There, the Court considered the question of whether 
commercial speech is so removed from any “exposition of ideas,” and 
from “truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,” that it lacks all 
protection.56 Specifically, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 
attacked the constitutionality of a state law that prohibited pharmacists 
from advertising prices for prescription drugs.57 The Court emphasized 
the importance of the free flow of information58 and concluded that 
commercial speech does not fall outside the protections of the First 
Amendment.59 Furthermore, commercial speech protections are not 
limited to verbal expression. Commercial illustrations receive the same 
protections as other forms of speech.60  
However, in holding that commercial speech is entitled to First 
Amendment protection, the Court was careful to note that “[s]ome 
forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.”61 The 
Court even took care to articulate such exceptions including time, place, 
and manner restrictions; restrictions on false or misleading speech; and 
restrictions on illegal speech.62 Later cases expounded this principle and 
declared that commercial speech enjoys less protection than 
noncommercial speech.63  
C.  The First Amendment Protects Compelled Speech 
It is clear that tobacco advertisements and labels are commercial 
speech and that commercial speech is protected. However, it is 
important to note that the graphic warning requirement mandates, rather 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Id. at 762. 
 56. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 749–50.  
 58. Id. at 764; id. at 765 (“It is a matter of public interest that . . . decisions, in the 
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensable.”); id. at 770 (noting that the public cannot be kept in ignorance).  
 59. Id. at 770; see also id. at 762 (noting that the fact that an advertiser’s interest is purely 
economic does not put him outside the scope of First Amendment protection). 
 60. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 
(1985) (“[C]ommercial illustrations are entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded 
verbal commercial speech . . . .”). 
 61. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
 62. Id. at 770–72 (emphasis added). 
 63. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 (“There is no longer any room to doubt that what has come 
to be known as ‘commercial speech’ is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit 
to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded ‘noncommercial speech.’”); Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (“The 
Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally 
guaranteed expression.”). 
10
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than prohibits, speech.64 This point begs the question of whether the 
First Amendment protects an individual or entity from the government 
compelling them to speak. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that 
the First Amendment protects “both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all.”65 Similarly, in Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, the Court noted “in 
some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First 
Amendment as prohibitions on speech.”66 Therefore, the graphic 
warning requirement does not fall outside the protection of the First 
Amendment solely because it compels speech rather than prohibits it.  
III.  LEVELS OF SCRUTINY APPLIED TO COMPELLED  
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The Supreme Court has articulated and applied standards of review 
to commercial speech and to compelled speech, but has only once 
evaluated the constitutionality of compelled commercial speech. The 
Court applied rational basis to a compelled disclosure, but it is unclear 
how far the Court’s opinion will reach. 
A.  Origins of Scrutiny 
As Part IV will demonstrate,67 the level of scrutiny applied to the 
graphic warning requirement proved to be outcome determinative in 
both of the appellate cases that addressed the constitutionality of the 
graphic warning requirement.68 The Supreme Court introduced the 
process of applying varying levels of scrutiny to laws depending on the 
right at stake in the famous Commerce Clause case, United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.69 In the early years following Carolene 
Products, the Supreme Court applied levels of scrutiny mostly to equal 
protection and due process cases, but now, the Supreme Court applies 
differing levels of scrutiny to a broad range of constitutional law 
issues.70 Originally the Court applied only two standards of review: 
strict scrutiny and rational basis review.71 However, when the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 64. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 558 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 65. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).  
 66. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.  
 67. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 68. See generally R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d 1205; Disc. Tobacco City & 
Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d 509. 
 69. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Matthew D. 
Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the 
Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 352 (2011). 
 70. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784. 
 71. Id.   
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began to apply these tests to First Amendment cases, the need for a third 
standard of review arose and intermediate scrutiny was born.72 Despite 
the frequency of mandated disclosures,73 little case precedent on the 
phenomenon of compelled commercial speech exists. The scarcity of 
precedent forces courts to borrow and apply to compelled disclosures 
doctrines that better suit other types of speech regulations.74 An analysis 
of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review as 
they may apply to compelled commercial speech follows.  
B.  Wooley v. Maynard and Strict Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to compelled speech in 
Wooley v. Maynard.75 In Wooley, appellee Maynard challenged a New 
Hampshire law that effectively required owners of a vehicle registered 
in the state to display the motto “Live Free or Die” on the vehicle’s 
license plate.76  Appellees were Jehovah’s Witnesses and “consider[d] 
the New Hampshire State motto to be repugnant to their moral, 
religious, and political beliefs.”77 The Court framed the issue as 
“whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to 
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying 
it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it 
be observed and read by the public.”78  
In addressing this issue, the Court first acknowledged that the 
“Maynards' interests . . . implicat[ed] First Amendment protections,”79 
and then stated that the State could not require the Maynards to display 
the motto unless the State had a “sufficiently compelling” interest in 
doing so.80 The State’s asserted interests were “facilitat[ing] the 
identification of passenger vehicles” and “promot[ing] appreciation of 
history, individualism, and state pride.”81 The Court suggested that the 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id.  
 73. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable 
Expectation of Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109, 
156–57 (2010) (providing examples of the use of compelled disclosures to protect consumers).  
 74. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 206 (2011) (“[C]ompelled-commercial-speech doctrine combines 
two existing doctrines: compelled speech and commercial speech . . . . [which] makes 
determining whether compelled-commercial-speech regulations violate the First Amendment 
difficult.”). 
 75. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (“We must also determine whether the 
State’s countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display 
the state motto on their license plates.”).  
 76. Id. at 706–07. 
 77. Id. at 705.  
 78. Id. at 713.  
 79. Id. at 715. 
 80. Id. at 716. 
 81. Id.  
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interest in identifying passenger vehicles might be compelling, but 
skirted around this issue and noted that the slogan was not necessary 
because state officers could identify passenger vehicles by looking at a 
number sequence.82 In other words, even if the state’s interest is 
compelling, the regulation will not pass muster if the state can achieve 
the interest by a less restrictive alternative.83 Furthermore, the Court 
found that the second asserted interest was not sufficiently compelling 
because it was “not ideologically neutral.”84 Thus, in order for a rule 
that compels speech to survive strict scrutiny, the government must 
show that the rule advances a sufficiently compelling ideologically 
neutral interest and the state cannot achieve such interest by a less 
restrictive alternative.  
Wooley v. Maynard does not specifically provide guidance on the 
application of strict scrutiny to compelled speech that is not ideological. 
However, later Supreme Court cases counsel on this question by 
providing bases for distinguishing Wooley. First, Wooley has been 
distinguished many times on the grounds that Wooley involved the 
compelled expression of an ideological message.85 Second, Wooley did 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 716–17. The Court stated: 
Even were we to credit the State’s reasons and “even though the governmental 
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means 
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more 
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the 
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” 
Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
 84. Id. at 717 (“[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how 
acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to 
avoid becoming the courier for such message.”). 
 85. In Zauderer, the Court explained that:  
[T]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those discussed 
in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to “prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion 
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” The State has 
attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, 
and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include 
in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the 
terms under which his services will be available.  
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); see also Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) (“Compelling a law 
school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is 
simply not the same as . . . forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto ‘Live Free or Die,’ 
and it trivializes the freedom protected in . . . Wooley to suggest that it is.”). 
13
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not involve commercial speech.86 These cases seem to indicate that 
strict scrutiny does not have a place in the compelled commercial 
speech context. The idea that compelled speech that is commercial in 
nature and does not convey an ideological message does not warrant 
strict scrutiny is in line with the notion that commercial speech enjoys 
less protection that noncommercial speech.  
C.  Central Hudson and Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court formulated the intermediate scrutiny test for 
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. 
Public Service Commission of New York.87 In Central Hudson, an 
electric company challenged an order that prohibited all electric utilities 
in New York from advertising to encourage the use of electricity.88  The 
Court acknowledged that the restriction concerned commercial speech 
and that commercial speech receives a lower degree of protection than 
noncommercial speech.89 The Court emphasized that because the 
informational purpose of commercial speech is important, the 
government must be able to suppress misleading commercial speech.90 
In other words, the Court suggested that if the speech is misleading, the 
regulation is not subject to heightened scrutiny, but if the speech is not 
misleading, the regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny.91 Thus, if 
the speech the government seeks to regulate is not misleading, the 
regulation must serve a substantial government interest, the regulation 
must be proportionate to that interest, and the regulation “must be 
designed carefully to achieve the [government’s] goal.”92 To satisfy the 
“designed carefully” requirement, the regulation must directly advance 
the asserted government interest and must not prove “more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.”93 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test seems more on point in 
the compelled commercial speech context than Wooley’s strict scrutiny 
standard. Central Hudson concerned a restriction, rather than a 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Royal, supra note 74, at 222 (explaining that Wooley 
applied to compelled speech rather than commercial speech).  
 87. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
 88. Id. at 558–59.  
 89. Id. at 561–63. 
 90. Id. at 563 (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The 
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform 
it . . . .”).  
 91. Id. at 562–63. In fact, the Court stated that misleading commercial speech does not 
come within the purview of First Amendment protection. Id. at 566.   
 92. Id. at 564. 
 93. Id. at 564–66. 
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mandate, but commercial speech doctrine may be more applicable to the 
development of compelled commercial speech doctrine than compelled 
speech doctrine.94 The more significant point is that the classification of 
the regulated speech as misleading or nonmisleading may have a strong 
impact on the level of scrutiny the Court applies, and may even 
determine whether the First Amendment provides any protection.  
D.  Zauderer and the Rational Basis Standard 
The Supreme Court articulated and applied a rational basis standard 
of review to regulations that concerned both compelled and commercial 
speech in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court 
of Ohio.95 In Zauderer, authorities charged an attorney for violating 
certain Ohio disciplinary rules by making misleading advertisements.96 
The complaint further alleged that the attorney–plaintiff violated the 
rules when he failed to disclose the terms of contingent fees in an 
advertisement that mentioned contingent fees.97 The attorney–plaintiff 
challenged both of these rules on First Amendment grounds.98 The 
Court analyzed the constitutionality of three rules: “prohibitions on 
soliciting legal business through advertisements containing advice and 
information regarding specific legal problems; restrictions on the use of 
illustrations in advertising by lawyers; and disclosure requirements 
relating to the terms of contingent fees.”99 
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of Central Hudson 
and its predecessors and noted that though the government has 
discretion to regulate misleading or deceptive speech, if the speech is 
not misleading or deceptive, the government must overcome 
intermediate scrutiny.100 The Court then performed an individual 
analysis on each of the three rules listed above. The first two rules 
underwent nearly identical analyses. The Court found that neither the 
advertisement that contained advice nor the illustrations were deceptive 
or misleading, and therefore the government had the burden to 
overcome intermediate scrutiny to uphold the first two regulations listed 
above.101 However, the analysis of the rule requiring disclosure of 
contingent fee terms proved quite different. First, the Court rejected the 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Royal, supra note 74, at 208 (examining which of the two doctrines applies to 
compelled commercial speech).  
 95. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629 
(1985). 
 96. Id. at 629, 631–33. 
 97. Id. at 633. 
 98. Id. at 634. 
 99. Id. at 638. 
 100. Id. at 638. 
 101. Id. at 641, 647. 
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attorney’s argument that the government must establish that the 
advertisement would have been misleading or deceptive without the 
disclosure.102 In other words, the attorney’s argument was that the Court 
should apply the same analysis to the disclosure requirements as the 
Court applied to the first two restrictions. The Court was quick to note 
that “appellant . . . overlooks material differences between disclosure 
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.”103 Essentially, the 
Court rejected the attorney’s argument because the First Amendment 
does little to protect an interest in failing to provide factual information 
in commercial speech.104 To be sure, the Court did not hold that 
disclosure requirements fall outside the scope of the First 
Amendment.105 Rather, disclosures are reviewed under a less stringent 
standard than restrictions.106 Specifically, “an advertiser's rights are 
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”107 
Thus, rational basis is applied to regulations that require factual 
disclosures, and the regulation is upheld as long as the regulation is 
reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing deception 
of consumers.108  
Zauderer provides guidance for analyzing compelled commercial 
speech, but it still leaves unanswered questions. Most importantly, when 
does the Zauderer standard apply?109 The Zauderer opinion is 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Id. at 650. 
 103. Id. The Court stated: 
In requiring attorneys who advertise their willingness to represent clients on a 
contingent-fee basis to state that the client may have to bear certain expenses 
even if he loses, Ohio has not attempted to prevent attorneys from conveying 
information to the public; it has only required them to provide somewhat more 
information than they might otherwise be inclined to present. 
Id. 
 104. The Court explained: 
[A]ppellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular 
factual information in his advertising is minimal. Thus, in virtually all our 
commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that because 
disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests 
than do flat prohibitions on speech, “warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be 
appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer 
confusion or deception.” 
Id. at 651 (citations omitted).  
 105. Id. at 650. 
 106. Id. at 651. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Cf. Royal, supra note 74, at 207 (“This new doctrine of compelled-commercial speech 
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somewhat unclear because the Court concludes that disclosures are 
reviewed under a different standard than restrictions on speech, and that 
factual disclosure requirements are constitutional as long as they are 
reasonably related to preventing consumer deception. However, the 
Court did not specify that Zauderer applies only when the disclosure 
pertains to misleading speech. In fact, the Court rejected Zauderer’s 
argument that the government must show the advertisement was 
misleading absent the disclosure. This determination, along with the 
reasoning behind it, suggests that all commercial speech is presumed to 
potentially deceive consumers,110 and in the case of all disclosure 
requirements the government’s only burden is to prove the regulation is 
reasonably related to preventing consumer deception. Thus, it is clear 
that Zauderer applies to factual disclosure requirements, but precisely 
what type of speech the disclosure must pertain to is questionable.  
IV.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The circuit courts are split as to the appropriate standard of review to 
apply to compelled commercial speech. The courts’ differences in 
opinion stem from their respective positions as to when regulated 
speech is misleading so as to warrant the application of Zauderer. The 
split demonstrates the need for Supreme Court precedent to reduce the 
amount of discretion courts have to answer this question. In the context 
of the graphic warning requirement, there is always a potentially real 
danger that the marketing of tobacco products will mislead consumers, 
and Zauderer should always apply. 
A.  Overview 
The Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit both ruled on the 
constitutionality of the graphic warning requirements. Both courts relied 
on the commercial speech and compelled speech standards of review 
presented in Part III, but reached conflicting conclusions.111 Given the 
unanswered questions inherent in Central Hudson and Zauderer, it 
comes as no surprise that two courts independently justified very 
different opinions. In fact, as the following discussion reveals, the 
                                                                                                                     
has created a line-drawing dilemma. For instance, it does not dictate when a factual-disclosure 
requirement, which may receive lenient review under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, becomes compelled speech requiring strict scrutiny.”). 
 110. The emphasis on the informational purpose of commercial speech further suggests 
that the Court views all commercial speech with an eye towards protecting consumers from 
deception. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such 
speech provides.”).  
111. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012).  
17
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courts disagreed over the type of regulation the graphic warnings 
qualify as.  
B.  Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States 
In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., a group of tobacco 
product manufacturers and vendors appealed the district court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment to the government on the tobacco 
companies’ claim that the graphic warning requirement violated their 
First Amendment rights.112 The court began with a discussion of 
findings about juvenile tobacco use.113 The court then recognized that 
the government has “a significant interest in preventing juvenile 
smoking and in warning the general public about the harms associated 
with the use of tobacco products.”114  
1.  Determining the Standard of Review 
In determining the standard of review to apply, the court took the 
stance that “[l]aws that restrict speech are fundamentally different than 
laws that require disclosures, and so are the legal standards governing 
each type of law.”115 The court then determined that it will evaluate 
commercial-speech disclosures that “fi[t] within the framework of 
Zauderer” under a rational basis standard, but it will evaluate 
disclosures that do not fit within that framework under the strict scrutiny 
standard set forth in Wooley.116 The court went further to note that its 
own precedent held that Zauderer applies to disclosures aimed at speech 
that is “inherently misleading” as well as disclosures that pertain to 
speech that is “potentially misleading.”117 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit’s 
view, courts should apply Zauderer to factual disclosures that are 
targeted at speech that is either inherently misleading or has the 
potential to mislead.118  
The court determined that, contrary to the cigarette companies’ 
argument, the mandated graphic warnings were factual disclosures 
rather than opinions.119 The court noted that the health risks of tobacco 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 518, 520. 
 113. Id. at 519. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 552. 
 116. Id. at 554; see also id. at 555 (noting that “Zauderer relied on the distinction between 
a fact and a personal or political opinion to distinguish factual, commercial-speech disclosure 
requirements, to which courts apply a rational-basis rule, from the type of compelled speech on 
matters of opinion that is ‘as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech’”) 
(quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 
(1985)). 
 117. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 558. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 561; see also id. at 569 (finding that a “disclosure that provokes a visceral 
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use are scientifically proven facts, and that cigarette companies can 
express these facts through graphics.120 Therefore, the court applied 
Zauderer’s rational basis standard.121 
2.  Application of Zauderer 
 
The court began to apply the Zauderer standard to the graphic 
warning requirement by noting that “[t]he Act’s required textual and 
graphic warnings are constitutional if there is a rational connection 
between the warnings’ purpose and the means used to achieve that 
purpose.”122 The court then found that the purpose of the warning was 
to “prevent consumers from being misled about the health risks of using 
tobacco.”123 In other words, the government’s interest was in the 
prevention of consumer deception. Because the government’s purpose 
behind the regulation is outcome determinative in the Zauderer test, the 
court’s reasoning behind this determination is of great interest. Here, the 
court focused on the history of deception in the tobacco industry.124 
Further, “[tobacco] advertising promoting smoking deceives consumers 
if it does not warn consumers about tobacco’s serious health risks.”125 
Thus, the court was satisfied that the government met one part of the 
rational basis test when it showed that the prevention of consumer 
deception was the purpose behind the graphic warning requirement.126  
The next inquiry was whether the graphic warnings were reasonably 
related to this purpose.127 The court noted that the then-current tobacco 
warning requirements were outdated and ineffective.128 This conclusion 
was based largely on findings about the size and complexity of the then-
current warnings.129 Finally, the court concluded that the graphic 
warning requirement solves these issues “by being larger and including 
                                                                                                                     
response [does not] fall outside Zauderer’s ambit. Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an 
emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically 
turn such facts into opinions.”). 
 120. Id. at 561. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 562 (“The genesis of the stated purpose is self-evident. Tobacco manufacturers 
and tobacco-related trade organizations (collectively, ‘Tobacco Companies’) knowingly and 
actively conspired to deceive the public about the health risks and addictiveness of smoking for 
decades.”). 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 561. 
 127. Id. at 562.  
 128. Id. at 563 (“They have not been revised since 1984 and do not effectively convey the 
risks of smoking, primarily because the warnings are easily overlooked.” (footnote omitted)). 
 129. Id. at 563–64. 
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graphics.”130 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that the graphic warning requirement 
does not violate the First Amendment because the government has an 
interest in preventing tobacco consumers from deception and the 
graphic warning requirement is reasonably related to that interest 
because it cures the imperfections in the current warnings.131  
C.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Administration 
The D.C. Circuit handed down the most recent decision on the 
constitutionality of the graphic warning requirement on August 24, 
2012.132 In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the FDA appealed a district 
court judgment that granted summary judgment to five tobacco 
companies on a claim that the graphic warning requirement violated the 
First Amendment.133 The court observed that “[a]t the outset of the 
Proposed Rule, FDA asserted the government's ‘substantial interest in 
reducing the number of Americans, particularly children and 
adolescents, who use cigarettes and other tobacco products in order to 
prevent the life-threatening health consequences associated with 
tobacco use.’”134 The court then discussed the criticisms the FDA 
received prior to the commencement of this case in regard to the study 
used to select the images.135  
1.  Determining the Standard of Review 
The court’s discussion of the appropriate standard of review to apply 
began with recognition of the protection given to compelled speech.136 
Before it dove into a discussion of the standards of review applied to 
speech, the court suggested that, even if the graphic warnings are 
commercial speech, the warnings may be so ideological as to warrant 
heightened scrutiny.137 The court then noted the two exceptions “to the 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 564. 
 131. Id. at 569. 
 132. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 133. Id. at 1208. 
 134. Id. at 1209. 
 135. Id. at 1210. 
 136. Id. at 1211.  
 137. The court reasoned that:  
Even assuming the Companies’ marketing efforts (packaging, branding, and 
other advertisements) can be properly classified as commercial speech, and 
thus subject to less robust First Amendment protections, a thorny question 
remains: how much leeway should this Court grant the government when it 
seeks to compel a product’s manufacturer to convey the state’s subjective—and 
perhaps even ideological—view that consumers should reject this otherwise 
legal, but disfavored, product? 
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general rule that content-based speech regulations—including 
compelled speech—are subject to strict scrutiny”138 and analyzed the 
applicability of those two exceptions.139 In its review of the Zauderer 
standard, the court opined that Zauderer and its progeny “establish that 
a disclosure requirement is only appropriate if the government shows 
that, absent a warning, there is a self-evident—or at least ‘potentially 
real’—danger that an advertisement will mislead consumers.”140 The 
court found that the graphic warning requirement was not properly 
aimed at preventing consumer deception and that the graphic warnings 
did not convey purely factual information.141 The court distinguished 
the graphic warnings from the “indisputably accurate” disclosures in 
Zauderer because consumers could misinterpret the graphic 
warnings.142 The court explained, for example, that “the image of a man 
smoking through a tracheotomy hole might be misinterpreted as 
suggesting that such a procedure is a common consequence of 
smoking.”143 Further, the court did not believe that the images were 
“‘purely’” factual because the FDA intended to “shock” consumers into 
remembering the dangers of smoking.144 Thus, the court found that 
Zauderer did not apply to the graphic warning requirement.145  
The court decided that because Zauderer did not apply, it was 
necessary to determine whether strict or intermediate scrutiny 
applied.146 The court accepted the government’s argument that it should 
regard the graphic warnings as restrictions on commercial speech, 
which are evaluated under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny 
standard.147 The court ultimately relied on its own precedent to conclude 
that Central Hudson is appropriately applied to compelled commercial 
speech.148  
2.  Application of Central Hudson 
The court noted that the first part of the test is to determine whether 
                                                                                                                     
Id. at 1212. 
 138. Id. (noting that factual disclosures are subject to rational basis review and commercial 
speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny).  
 139. Id. at 1213–17. 
 140. Id. at 1214. 
 141. Id. at 1214–17. 
 142. Id. at 1216.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1217.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.   
 148. Id. (noting that it applied Central Hudson to the requirement in United States v. 
Phillip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2009), which was also a compelled commercial 
disclosure). 
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the government’s interest is substantial.149 If the government passes this 
test, then it must also prove that “the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and . . . is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.”150 In its determination of the 
government’s interest, the court noted that it must look only to the 
interest asserted by the government.151 The court found that “[t]he only 
explicitly asserted interest in either the Proposed or Final Rule is an 
interest in reducing smoking rates.”152  
Before it determined whether this was a substantial interest, the 
court addressed the issue of whether the government could show that 
the graphic warning requirement directly furthered that interest.153 The 
court found that the government failed to satisfy its burden to prove that 
the graphic warning requirement directly advanced its interest in the 
prevention of smoking.154 Thus, the court concluded that the graphic 
warning requirement did not pass intermediate scrutiny because the 
government failed the second part of the Central Hudson test when it 
failed to show any evidence that the graphic warning requirement 
furthered the government’s interest in the reduction of smoking rates.155  
D.  Closing the Gap 
The graphic warning requirement controversy indicates that now is 
the time for the Supreme Court to set more definite standards for testing 
the constitutionality of compelled commercial speech. In both Discount 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, the 
classification of the regulated speech, as misleading or nonmisleading, 
and the classification of the regulation itself, as a requirement or a 
disclosure, significantly impacted the level of scrutiny the court chose to 
apply.156 Because of the high degree of variation among the standards of 
scrutiny, the level of scrutiny the court applies in many First 
Amendment cases, including Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. and 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, is outcome determinative. It is 
problematic that the courts reach opposite conclusions over whether the 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1217 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 151. Id. at 1218 (“Unlike rational-basis review, the Central Hudson standard does not 
permit this Court to ‘supplant the precise interests put forward by [FDA] with other 
suppositions.’”). 
 152. Id.; see also id. (noting that the government’s counsel argued other interests, but the 
court did not find these interests in the administrative record). 
 153. Id. at 1218–19. 
 154. Id. at 1219 (“FDA has not provided a shred of evidence—much less the ‘substantial 
evidence’ required by the APA—showing that the graphic warnings will ‘directly advance’ its 
interest in reducing the number of Americans who smoke.”). 
 155. Id. at 1222. 
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graphic warnings are targeted at the prevention of consumer deception 
and whether they are factual disclosures.157 Thus, the Supreme Court 
must explicitly address two questions: When is regulated speech 
misleading as to warrant the application of Zauderer and when is a 
disclosure factual? This Note is concerned primarily with the former.  
As applied to the facts, the logical answer is that any advertisement 
or marketing of a potentially lethal product is misleading absent a 
disclosure. The Sixth Circuit was of the opinion that Zauderer applies to 
disclosures aimed at speech that is either “inherently misleading” or 
“potentially misleading.”158 But the D.C. Circuit will apply Zauderer 
only when there is a “‘potentially real’—danger that an advertisement 
will mislead consumers’” without a disclosure.159  
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s stringent tone, the two courts essentially 
apply the same standard: The targeted speech must have the potential to 
mislead consumers. But the D.C. Circuit manipulated the facts to 
survive this standard. The D.C. Circuit refused to consider the history of 
deceptive tobacco advertising and found that the government did not 
show that, without the disclosure, future tobacco advertising would 
mislead consumers.160 The court itself noted that when it applies 
rational basis review the court is not constrained by the interests the 
government specifically asserts,161 but nonetheless it used its discretion 
to find the government’s additional interests without merit.162 The Sixth 
Circuit, on the other hand, placed tremendous emphasis on the tobacco 
industry’s history of deceptive practices.163  
While the Court revisited Zauderer on several occasions,164 the 
current circuit split evinces that under existing precedent, courts have 
too much discretion to determine whether a regulation is aimed at the 
prevention of consumer deception. At the outset, it is important to note 
that in Zauderer, the Court stated that “[w]hen the possibility of 
                                                                                                                     
 156. See id. at 1217; Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 
552 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 157. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216; Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 
F.3d at 561–62. 
 158. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 558. 
 159. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & 
Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)). 
 160. Id. at 1215–16. 
 161. Id. at 1218. 
 162. Id. at 1215–16. 
 163. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 562 (“Tobacco manufacturers and 
tobacco-related trade organizations (collectively, ‘Tobacco Companies’) knowingly and actively 
conspired to deceive the public about the health risks and addictiveness of smoking for 
decades.”).  
 164. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249–53 
(2010); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 
146 (1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993). 
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deception is as self-evident as it is in this case, we need not require the 
State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public before it [may] determine 
that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.’”165 
Several Supreme Court opinions handed down since Zauderer also 
shed light onto the type of speech to which the Court intends Zauderer 
to apply. In Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional 
Regulation, Board of Accountancy, the Board of Accountancy sought to 
require an attorney to include disclaimers in connection with the use of 
the Certified Financial Planner and Certified Public Accountant 
designations in advertisements, and argued that the designation was 
“‘potentially misleading.’”166 The Court found that the Board failed to 
“point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely hypothetical,” and 
reasoned that “invocation of the words ‘potentially misleading’ [does 
not] supplant the Board's burden to ‘demonstrate that the harms it 
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a 
material degree.’”167  
While the D.C. Circuit relied in part on Ibanez to avoid the 
application of Zauderer,168 the Court’s language helps to justify rather 
than refute the argument that the graphic warnings are aimed at 
preventing deception. As Part V explains, the “harms [the government] 
recites” are “real” rather than “purely hypothetical” and the warnings 
will “alleviate them to a material degree.”169 Further, in Lorillard 
Tobacco Company v. Reilly, the Court clarified that the proponent of the 
regulation is not required to present “empirical data . . . accompanied by 
a surfeit of background information” to show that the “harms . . . are 
real,” but that a proponent may justify a regulation “based solely on 
history, consensus, and simple common sense.”170  
The Court’s more recent decision in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 
P.A. v. United States may prove most relevant.171 In Milavetz, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of required disclosures in debt relief 
agencies’ advertisements.172 The Court applied the Zauderer standard, 
and reasoned that the “[g]overnment maintains that [the regulation] is 
directed at misleading commercial speech” and “impose[s] a disclosure 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
652–53 (1985). 
 166. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Peel v. Attorney 
Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 116 (1990)). 
167. Id.  
 168. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
 169. See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146 (citation omitted); see also discussion infra Part V.  
 170. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Florida Bar v. 
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 171. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010). 
 172. Id. at 232. 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/9
2013] WHY GRAPHIC WARNINGS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT CONSUMER DECEPTION 2079 
 
requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on speech.”173 In 
response to Milavetz’s argument that the government did not offer 
evidence that the regulated speech was misleading, the Court announced 
that evidence of a pattern of misleading advertisements is sufficient to 
establish potential deception.174  
As Part V will explain, tobacco companies undoubtedly misled 
consumers through deceptive advertising for decades and, albeit through 
a subtler means, they continue to do so. 175 Thus, pursuant to the Court’s 
reasoning in Milavetz, Ibanez, and Lorillard, common sense and the 
tobacco industry’s history of deception should make it painfully clear 
that absent a disclosure on tobacco packages and advertisements, all 
tobacco advertisements and labels are potentially misleading. 
Nonetheless, the current precedent is malleable enough to enable courts 
to manipulate the facts and standards to achieve a politically favorable 
result. The Supreme Court needs to carve out a rule that applies to 
disclosures of health risks and underscores the fact that there is always a 
“potentially real danger” that the marketing of tobacco products will 
mislead consumers.  
V.  THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISEMENTS AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW WARNINGS 
Tobacco industry marketing efforts misled and continue to mislead 
consumers about the health risks of tobacco use. Graphic warnings will 
more effectively reduce the deceptive impact of the industry’s 
innovative marketing efforts than the outdated, text-only warnings 
currently in use.    
A.  “Just What the Doctor Ordered”: A Look at the Ads 
Perhaps Eva Cooper failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove 
precisely which advertisements her husband detrimentally relied on,176 
but she did not fabricate the concept of deceptive advertising in an 
effort to win a lawsuit. Stanford School of Medicine’s exhibit, “Not a 
Cough In a Carload: Images from the Campaign by the Tobacco 
Industry to Hide the Hazards of Smoking,”177 featured in Time 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Id. at 249. 
 174. Id. at 251; see also id. (noting that “[w]hen the possibility of deception is as self-
evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public 
before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead’” (second and third 
alterations in original) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 652–53 (1985))).   
 175. See discussion infra Part V. 
 176. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D. Mass. 1957). 
 177. A Stanford School of Medicine research group, known as Stanford Research into the 
Impact of Tobacco Advertising (SRITA), is dedicated to analyzing the impact of tobacco 
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magazine178 demonstrates just how blatantly misleading early tobacco 
advertisements were. The most deceitful advertisements featured 
statements including: “As your Dentist, I would recommend 
Viceroys,”179 “Nose, throat, and accessory organs not adversely affected 
by smoking Chesterfields,” “No other cigarette approaches such a 
degree of health protection and taste satisfaction,” “Just what the doctor 
ordered,” and the Camel assertion Cooper relied on, “More Doctors 
smoke Camels than any other cigarette.”180 
Though cigarette advertisements no longer boast statements from 
doctors and dentists who proclaim the health benefits of smoking, 
deceptive tobacco advertisements are not a thing of the past.181 The 
congressional findings in support of the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act indicate that “[t]obacco product advertising 
often misleadingly portrays the use of tobacco as socially acceptable 
and healthful to minors.”182 The government also notes “there is 
significant evidence to show that consumers lack knowledge about or 
underestimate the health risks of smoking.”183 As noted in Part IV, 
speech regulations, even in the strict scrutiny context, the Court justified 
based on “simple common sense.”184 Common sense and a quick glance 
at a modern tobacco advertisement are telling about the potential for 
tobacco advertisements to deceive. Today’s generation of tobacco 
advertisements portray smoking as a glamorous, “unique,” 
“enchanting,” and “enticing” hobby.185 In 2005, Kool, owned by R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company, launched a series of advertisements 
featuring musicians, including guitar players, disc jockeys, and, 
ironically, a voice artist.186 Camel, another R.J. Reynolds brand, 
                                                                                                                     
advertising, marketing, and promotion. SRITA compiled the exhibit, which features vintage 
tobacco advertisements. Museum Exhibit, STANFORD RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO 
ADVERTISING, http://srita.stanford.edu/exhibit.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).  
 178. Your Doctor Wants You to Smoke, TIME, 
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1848212_1777633,00.html (last visited Dec. 
27, 2013).  
 179. Id.  
 180. Slogans, STANFORD RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING, 
http://tobacco.stanford.edu/tobacco_main/slogans.php (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 181. See generally Robert Jackler, Get ‘em Young and Train ‘em Right, YOUTUBE (June 
21, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apQIsXSFXtw. 
 182. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(17), 
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 183. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,697 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
 184. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Florida Bar v. 
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628).  
 185. Tobacco Industry Ad Gallery, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/ad_gallery (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 186. Kool Modern, STANFORD RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING, 
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recently introduced Camel No. 9 cigarettes, packaged in sleek pink and 
black cartons, almost certainly marketed to teenage girls.187 Camel No. 
9’s are apparently “light & luscious,” and, according to a 2007 
advertisement, now “available in stiletto.”188 Flavored smokeless 
tobacco, which stands a greater chance of being overlooked in schools, 
is one of the latest trends.189 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190 191 192 
Further, a Stanford Medical School professor observed that the 
tobacco industry continues to use the same advertising tactics it always 
used, namely advertising that targets teenagers and young adults,193 a 
problem the government also recognizes.194 That cigarette companies 
                                                                                                                     
http://tobacco.stanford.edu/tobacco_main/subtheme.php?token=fm_mt026.php (follow “Kool 
Modern” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).  
 187. Jackler, supra note 181 (calling Camel No. 9 “a cynical attempt to get teenage girls 
with pink cigarettes”); see also Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New 
Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F., LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS 
LIBRARY, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/far01d00/pdf [hereinafter Research Planning 
Memorandum] (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (suggesting that a tobacco company should reach the 
youth market by tailoring brands to youths). 
 188. Tobacco Industry Ad Gallery, supra note 185, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/ 
ad_gallery/category/camel/P45 (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 189. Jackler, supra note 181 (noting that tobacco manufacturers now market flavored 
smokeless tobacco to youth since the FDA prohibited flavored cigarettes, and that kids may get 
away with chewing tobacco in school). 
 190. Tobacco Industry Ad Gallery, supra note 185, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/ 
ad_gallery/P15 (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 191. Tobacco Industry Ad Gallery, supra note 185, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/ 
ad_gallery/category/camel/P45. 
 192. Kool Modern, supra note 186, http://171.67.24.121/tobacco_web/images/ 
tobacco_ads/recent_strategies/kool_modern/large/kool_08.jpg.   
 193. Jackler, supra note 181; see also Reiner Hanewinkel et al., Cigarette Advertising and 
Teen Smoking Initiation, 127 PEDIATRICS 271, 276 (2011) (noting that “tobacco companies aim 
their message at adolescents because this is when most people start smoking”). 
 194. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 
2(15), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (finding 
that “[a]dvertising, marketing, and promotion of tobacco products have been especially directed 
to attract young persons to use tobacco products, and these efforts have resulted in increased use 
of such products by youth. Past efforts to oversee these activities have not been successful in 
 
27
English: “Camels Agree with your Throat” and Other Lies: Why Graphic Warni
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
2082 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
target youth is not simply an inference drawn from the content of the 
advertisements. Tobacco companies’ internal documents, produced in 
the course of litigation, confirm that the industry strategically marketed 
to America’s youth.195 The documents reveal that the industry 
recognizes the importance of young smokers to the survival of its 
business196 and the tobacco companies strive to attain their “share of the 
youth market.”197 Most disturbing is the suggestion that marketing to 
the “beginning smoker should emphasize the desirable psychological 
effects of smoking, also suggesting the desirable physical effects to be 
expected later.”198  
B.  Impact of Tobacco Advertisements 
Not only do tobacco companies target teenagers,199 studies show that 
their tactic works.200 A recent study, conducted among 3,029 
adolescents between the ages of ten and seventeen years old,201 
indicates “that the association between tobacco advertisement and youth 
smoking is specific to tobacco advertising content and not simply a 
marker of an adolescent that is generally receptive to marketing.”202 
Similarly, a study published in 2000 “supports a close linkage between 
tobacco promotional activities and uptake of smoking among 
adolescents beyond baseline descriptions of receptivity to cigarette 
promotions.”203 These studies support congressional findings that 
indicate that “[c]hildren are more influenced by tobacco marketing than 
adults: more than 80 percent of youth smoke three heavily marketed 
brands, while only 54 percent of adults, 26 and older, smoke these same 
brands.”204 Tobacco advertisements are effective because they portray 
the idea that smoking cigarettes will help vulnerable adolescents to 
achieve the characteristics they yearn for, such as masculinity and sex 
                                                                                                                     
adequately preventing such increased use”).  
 195. See generally UNIV. OF CAL., S.F., LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS LIBRARY, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/popular_documents (last visited Dec. 15, 2012).  
 196. The Importance of Younger Adults, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F., LEGACY TOBACCO 
DOCUMENTS LIBRARY, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jye76b00/pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 
2012) (noting that “[y]ounger adults are the only source of replacement smokers” and sixty-nine 
percent of smokers start at age eighteen or younger).  
 197. Research Planning Memorandum, supra note 187 (suggesting that a tobacco company 
should reach the youth market by tailoring brands to youth). 
 198. Id.   
 199. See, e.g., Hanewinkel et al., supra note 193, at 276. 
 200. Id. at 272.  
 201. Id. at 272–73. 
 202. Id. at 276. 
 203. James D. Sargent et al., Effect of Cigarette Promotions on Smoking Uptake Among 
Adolescents, 30 PREVENTATIVE MED. 320, 320 (2000).  
 204. Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(23), 123 
Stat. 1778 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
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appeal.205 Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized the impact of 
advertisements on youth. In Lorillard v. Reilly, the Court acknowledged 
that “there is sufficient evidence to conclude that advertising and 
labeling play a significant and important contributory role in a young 
person's decision to use . . . tobacco products.”206 
While it is disheartening that the tobacco industry continues to 
employ deceptive techniques to market a deadly product, the ugly truth 
is that tobacco manufacturers, like other businesses, are all about the 
bottom line. Absent legally imposed constraints, the industry will 
continue to do what it takes to sell its product. Thus, some measure 
must cure, or at least offset the impact of both past and current tobacco 
advertisements. Sure, schools nationwide implement antidrug 
programs,207 but showing an educational video once a year will not 
counteract the effects of deceptive advertisements. Advertisements that 
portray a sophisticated and prohibited adult activity have a much 
stronger impact on teenagers than bare statistics on smoking deaths.208  
C.  Effectiveness of Graphic Warnings 
Research suggests that tobacco warning labels work209 and smoking 
rates declined since their introduction in 1965.210 But the current 
warning labels, in place since 1984, desperately need a facelift,211 as 
evidenced by statistics212 that demonstrate that current warning 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Hanewinkel et al., supra note 193, at 276–77. 
 206. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558 (2001) (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. 
41,314, 41,332 (Aug. 11, 1995)). 
 207. See Jackler, supra note 181. 
 208. Jackler, supra note 181; see also Nancy Zuckerbrod, Study: Cigarette Ads Stomp Out 
Anti-Smoking Efforts, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ 
story?id=88094&page=1#.UOXl-EJ5nFI (noting that “[t]eenagers are less responsive to 
information about health risks than they are about the overall psychological view of smoking 
that’s fostered by tobacco marketing” (quoting Matthew Myers, President, Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids)). An internal memorandum circulated within R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company discusses the potential to capitalize on “older establishment” disapproval of tobacco 
products because it causes youths “to want to be defiant and smoke.” Some Thoughts About New 
Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F., LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS 
LIBRARY, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/frs84a00/pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). 
 209. Tobacco Warning Labels: Evidence of Effectiveness, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE 
KIDS [hereinafter Tobacco Warning Labels], http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/ 
factsheets/pdf/0325.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 210. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY 
REPORT: CIGARETTE SMOKING–UNITED STATES, 1965–2008, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6001a24.htm. 
 211. See Tobacco Warning Labels, supra note 209.  
 212. As of 2010, about 69.6 million Americans over age twelve used tobacco products and 
the highest usage rate was among young adults. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2010 NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 4, available at 
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requirements do not adequately offset the influence of tobacco 
advertisements.213 Small-print textual warnings are not fit to compete 
with innovative advertisements designed by sophisticated advertising 
agencies.214  
New studies indicate that graphic warnings are likely the makeover 
that current warnings need.215 The Harvard School of Public Health 
partnered with the University of California’s Legacy Tobacco 
Documents Library to conduct a study focusing on the impact of 
graphic warnings across various racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
groups.216 Researchers randomly assigned participants to groups to view 
either text-only or graphic warnings and then rated the groups’ reactions 
to the warnings based on salience, perceived impact, credibility, and 
intention to quit.217 Participants from all backgrounds consistently 
indicated considerably stronger reactions to the graphic warnings than 
text-only warnings in all categories.218 The research concluded 
“[graphic] warning labels may be one of the few tobacco control 
policies that have the potential to reduce communication inequalities 
across groups. Policies that establish strong pictorial warning labels on 
tobacco packaging may be instrumental in reducing the toll of the 
tobacco epidemic, particularly within vulnerable communities.”219 
A separate study, conducted by University of South Carolina 
researchers, surveyed 1,000 daily smokers who rated warnings based on 
credibility, effectiveness, and personal relevancy.220 The participants 
indicated that graphic warnings are more relevant and effective than 
text-only warnings.221 The most vivid images proved the most 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf; see also Smoking and 
Tobacco Use, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/ 
data_statistics/fact_sheets/youth_data/tobacco_use/index.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (noting 
that “[e]ach day in the United States, nearly 4,000 people younger than 18 years of age smoke 
their first cigarette, and an estimated 1,000 youth in that age group become new daily cigarette 
smokers”).  
 213. See Tobacco Warning Labels, supra note 209.  
 214. See Jackler, supra note 181.  
 215. Jennifer Cantrell et. al., Impact of Tobacco-Related Health Warning Labels Across 
Socioeconomic, Race and Ethnic Groups: Results from a Randomized Web-Based Experiment, 8 
PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (2013); Mary Brophy Marcus, Gruesome Cigarette Pack Images Sway 
Smokers, Study Finds, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 13, 2012), http://health.usnews.com/health-
news/news/articles/2012/11/13/gruesome-cigarette-pack-images-sway-smokers-study-finds. 
 216. Cantrell et al., supra note 215, at 1; Press Release, Harvard School of Public Health, 
Graphic Warnings on Cigarettes Effective Across Demographic Groups (Jan. 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/graphic-warnings-on-cigarettes-
effective-across-demographic-groups. 
 217. Cantrell et al., supra note 215, at 2–4.  
 218. Id. at 1.  
 219. Id. at 1, 10.  
 220. Marcus, supra note 215. 
 221. Id. 
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effective.222 The study suggests that adults are more responsive to 
illustrations than text223 and it likely follows that visuals impact 
adolescents also more than black-and-white text.224 Alluring tobacco 
advertisements suggest that the tobacco industry is well aware of this 
fact and already capitalizes on it. The courts should not inhibit the FDA 
from attempting to do the same to protect the public health and inform 
our nation’s youth of the risks of tobacco use. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite an uphill battle, tobacco regulation progressed significantly 
since the day Eva Cooper left a Massachusetts courtroom without her 
husband and without a remedy. However, the challenges to the graphic 
warning requirement present a threat of regression as the current 
warnings lose their effect in the face of a tobacco industry that remains 
on the cutting edge of advertising techniques. The D.C. Circuit’s 
adverse ruling already led the FDA to withdraw the original set of 
labels, and it thus remains open-ended how the next round of graphics 
will hold up in court against potential tobacco industry challenges.225 
Graphic warnings may be the FDA’s best shot at competing with the 
industry, but the lack of development of compelled commercial speech 
doctrine presents opponents of required disclosures with too much room 
to maneuver around the existing standards.226  
Currently, courts have three options when they evaluate the 
constitutionality of compelled commercial speech: apply Wooley’s strict 
scrutiny standard, Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard, or 
Zauderer’s rational basis standard.227 Courts agree that Zauderer 
sometimes applies to compelled commercial speech, but disagree as to 
whether the strict scrutiny standard, borrowed from compelled speech 
doctrine, or the intermediate scrutiny standard, borrowed from 
commercial speech doctrine, is the applicable standard when the 
                                                                                                                     
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (noting that “[r]esearch on cigarette warnings in the United States and other 
countries has repeatedly shown that pictures work better than text” (quoting Dr. James Thrasher, 
Associate Professor, University of South Carolina)). 
 224. Id. (noting that “people live in a more visual world now, with quick images on 
television, in games and in movies, so this type of study in younger adolescent smokers is also 
worth exploring”). 
 225. See Michael Felberbaum, AP Newsbreak: US to Revise Cigarette Warning Labels, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 19, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-us-revise-
cigarette-warning-labels. 
 226. Royal, supra note 74, at 206. 
 227. See discussion supra Part III; see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 
1205, 1211–13 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 
509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) (determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply). 
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regulation does not meet Zauderer’s prerequisites.228 The Sixth 
Circuit’s view that courts appropriately apply strict scrutiny to 
compelled commercial disclosures is somewhat unpersuasive, 
considering the Court’s repeated emphasis on the lesser degree of 
protection afforded to commercial speech.229  
Of course, the most pertinent disagreement among courts surrounds 
the application of Zauderer. Zauderer’s importance to the survival of 
disclosure requirements cannot be overstated, but like the current 
tobacco warnings, courts must refine the standard. Zauderer’s extension 
to the graphic warning requirement and similar disclosures is key to the 
government’s ability to effectively protect consumers from deception. 
Because consumer deception poses its greatest hazard when consumer 
health is concerned, this Note urges the Court to set the precedent that 
there is always a “potentially real” risk that consumers will be deceived 
by the advertisement and marketing of a product that carries far more 
than a “purely hypothetical” chance of resulting fatalities.  
Zauderer is the appropriate standard of review to apply to the 
graphic warning requirement. Under Zauderer, factual disclosures are 
upheld as long as the regulation is reasonably related to the 
government’s interest in the prevention of consumer deception.230 The 
graphic warnings, while certainly capable of inducing an emotional 
response, are factual disclosures that are rationally related to the 
government’s interest in preventing consumers, particularly America’s 
youth, from the inherent deception of tobacco advertising and 
marketing.231  
                                                                                                                     
 228. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217; Disc.Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 
F.3d at 554. 
 229. See discussion supra Section II.B.  
 230. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985). 
 231. See discussion supra Part V.  
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